Abstract Many economic models and optimization problems generate (endogenous) shadow prices-alias dual variables or Lagrange multipliers. Frequently the "slopes" of resulting price curves-that is, multiplier derivatives-are of great interest. These objects relate to the Jacobian of the optimality conditions. That particular matrix often has block structure. So, we derive explicit formulas for the inverse of such matrices and, as a consequence, for the multiplier derivatives.
(or performance criterion) stems from optimization, then duality theory delivers derivative estimates with respect to parameter perturbations. On such occasions, first-order information is already embodied in Lagrange multipliers.
This feature is well-known, very convenient-and frequently fully satisfying. Some situations call though, for one step further down the road: they require second derivatives of the value (perturbation) function. To meet that request amounts to produce derivatives of Lagrange multipliers. Such derivatives are the main objects of this paper.
Our motivation stems from extremum problems of the following prototypical sort: Choose x ∈ X to optimize f (x, t) subject to h(x, t) = 0.
(
Here the objective function f is real-valued, t ∈ T is a parameter, and h maps X × T into E. All spaces X, T, E are finite-dimensional Euclidean with inner products ·, · . For the applications we have in mind, f does not depend on t, and h(x, t) = t − H(x) with a function H from X into E = T. We then choose x ∈ X to optimize f (x) subject to H(x) = t.
For the more general problem (1) consider the standard Lagrangian
L(x, t, λ) := f (x, t) + λ, h(x, t) and a Kuhn-Tucker (primal-dual) solution t → (x(t), λ(t))
. Assuming differentiability, we mainly want to assess d dt λ(t). For this purpose one could first introduce the optimal value function v(t) := opt x {f (x, t) : h(x, t) = 0} ; second, argue that in the specially structured case (2) 
one has λ(t) = v (t)-and finally, identify λ (t) = v (t).
This plan presumes however, that v(·) be twice differentiable. In fact, quite often v is not even differentiable. So, the said plan may encounter formidable hurdles. To mitigate these we posit that f , h be at least C 2 . Further, assume the constraint qualification that D x h(x, t) has full row rank at any optimal x. Plainly, problem (1) is fairly tractable, featuring neither restricted decision sets nor inequality constraints. 1 Nonetheless, its format is frequent and important enough to merit separate treatment.
For motivation Sect. 2 brings out four examples, all of micro-economic or game theoretic sort. In these, as in manifold other instances, the Jacobian of the optimality conditions comes as a block-structured matrix. Section 3 therefore prepares the ground by inverting a suitable class of such matrices. Section 4 applies that inversion to estimate parameter sensitivity of primal-dual solutions in smooth, equality-constrained optimization, phrased in the forms (1) and (2) . We illustrate the results with an example.
While the findings in this paper may partly be seen as consequences of more general results from the literature, our main concern is to connect these second order sensitivity results with important applications from economics and, thus, provide insights for audiences from both areas.
Motivation
Example 2.1 (Risk aversion in the small [21] ) Consider an economic agent who maximizes his utility u(x) subject to Ax = t + t. The matrix A has merely one row, x is a column vector of appropriate size, t is a real constant, and t is a random variable, called a risk, with expectation E t = 0. The objective u(·) is concave, whence so is the associated reduced function
emerging ex post, after t has been unveiled. Since, by Jensen's inequality, EU(t + t) ≤ U(t), the agent displays risk aversion ex ante. He is then willing to pay a premium for avoiding uncertainty. Define that premium by EU(t + t) = U(t − ). To estimate , assume differentiability, and develop both sides of the last equation. Doing so yields
and thereby
The quotient −U (t)/U (t) is called the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. 2 Under appropriate conditions there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ, satisfying U (t) = λ. Suppose the mapping t → λ(t) so defined be differentiable. Then
Example 2.2 (Production games [6] ) Suppose individual i ∈ I, 2 ≤ |I| < +∞, faces a "private production task" t i , construed as an obligation to supply a resource bundle (vector) t i in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space E, equipped with inner product ·, · . If supplying x i ∈ E, he incurs cost
Members of any coalition S ⊆ I could pool their tasks, coordinate their efforts, and thereby generate aggregate cost
with t S := i∈S t i . Construction (4), being crucial in nonlinear analysis, is commonly called an inf-convolution; see [19] . A cost-sharing scheme (c i ) ∈ R I resides in the core iff Pareto efficient: i∈I c i = C I (t I ), and socially stable:
Suppose λ ∈ E is a Lagrange multiplier that relaxes the coupling constraint in (4) when S = I. More precisely, suppose
then belongs to the core [6] . Existence of a Lagrange multiplier λ is ensured if C I (·) is finite-valued in a neighborhood around t I and convex.
For a monopolistic setting of this story, suppose the agents are parallel branches of an integrated concern, gaining aggregate revenue R(t) when putting out total production volume t. To verify its second order optimality-or to test for possible risk aversion-the said concern would look at R (t) − C I (t). Assume C I has a second Fréchet-derivative in a neighborhood of t which is continuous and non-singular at that point. Then, if C I is convex, by a result of Crouzeix [3] ,
where t * = λ = C I (t) and C * I (t * ) = i∈I C * i (t * ). For generalization, see [22, Theorem 13.21] . It follows, under quite similar assumptions on the C i , that
where x i , i ∈ I, is the supposedly unique, feasible profile that yields total cost C I (t). The upshot is that
For interpretation and analogy regard C i (x i ) as the "resistance" in branch i, its inverse being the corresponding "conductance" there. Formula (6) then points to electrical engineering, saying that the conductance of a parallel circuit equals the sum of conductances [5] .
For a quite opposite, perfectly competitive setting, let i ∈ I be independent firms, each acting as a price-taking supplier in common product markets. These markets clear at price p = λ = C (t I ), and marginal costs are then equal across the industry: p = C i (x i ) for each smooth-cost firm i having optimal choice x i interior to the domain where C i is finite-valued. Let E = R G for a finite set G of goods. Fixing any two goods g,ḡ ∈ G the demand elasticity of the first good with respect to the price of the second is defined by
Important market games [23] obtain by rather putting profit (instead of cost) at center stage. Specifically, if agent i ∈ I owns resources t i ∈ E, and enjoys payoff π i : E → R∪ {−∞} , the characteristic form TU-game
has for each λ ∈ E, satisfying sup x i∈I
That is, i∈S c i ≥ π S (t S ) for all S ⊂ I with equality when S = I. Such market games are vehicles in studies of welfare gains from trading natural resources, be the latter fish quotas or pollution permits [8] . 
Here is a finite state space, equipped with probability measure ω → Pr(ω) > 0. Correspondingly, let E := R have probabilistic inner product e, e := ω∈ e(ω)e (ω) Pr(ω). Agent i now owns a risk t i ∈ E. In that optic a Lagrange multiplier λ ∈ E has twin properties: After state ω has been unveiled it holds for Example 2.4 (Playing the market [9] ) Instead of agents i ∈ I all being part of one corporation (or mutual), suppose now that these parties compete in the following manner. At a first stage firm i independently commits to supply the commodity vector t i ∈ E. By doing so it gains gross revenue R i (t) in the market, t := (t i ) ∈ E I denoting the profile of commitments. Production cost must be covered though. So, for the sake of efficiency and fair sharing, after t has already been committed, firms collaborate and split costs as described by (5) . Consequently, the final payoff to firm i equals
λ ∈ E being a Lagrange multiplier associated to the problem (4) when S = I. Let t −i be short notation for t j j =i and declare the profile t a Nash equilibrium if for each i
It is tacitly understood here that λ depends on t I = i∈I t i . We posit that each party fully knows that feature. Assuming differentiability, the first order optimality conditions for equilibrium read: for each i ∈ I,
x i being the supposedly unique choice in (4) when S = I. For λ one may apply formula (6) . Admittedly, the issues concerning existence and uniqueness of such Nash equilibrium are intricate. For discussion of these issues see [8, 10] . In the above examples problem (1) assumes the simpler form (2) for which λ is commonly called a shadow price. Since our results about derivatives of optimal value functions and Lagrange multipliers can be obtained for the more general problem (1) without much additional effort, we will concentrate on this setting and give the simplified formulas for instance (2) in the end.
As will be shown in Sect. 4 in more detail, the KKT conditions of problem (1), namely:
generate a Jacobian with block form
L(x, t, λ) and B = D x h(x, t). This simple observation leads us to inquire next about inversion of such matrices.
3 The inverse of a structured block matrix Definition 3.1 For an (n, n)−matrix A and an (n, k)−matrix B with k < n the restriction of A to the kernel of B is defined as
where V denotes any matrix whose columns form a basis of ker(B ).
Remark 3.2
In the following we will only be interested in properties of A| ker(B ) which do not depend on the actual choice of V.
A proof for the well known part (a) of the following theorem can be found in [17] . Part (b) was first shown in [15] under more general assumptions, requiring an elaborate proof technique. In fact, there the Moore-Penrose inverse of Q is given for the case that B does not possess full rank. In contrast, here we give an elementary proof for a problem structure which is adequate for the applications we have in mind. 
Proof of part (b) By part (a), we have rank(B) = k so that M is well defined and
V is an (n, n − k)−matrix with rank(V) = n − k and V B = 0. Also by part (a), the matrix V AV is nonsingular, so that W is well defined, too. Now consider the equation
or, equivalently, the system
A basis for the homogeneous part of (10) is given by the columns of V, and it is easily verified that B(B B) −1 d is a particular solution. Thus the solutions of (10) are given as
with ξ ∈ R n−k . Plugging (11) into (9) and multiplying by V from the left yields an equation which can be solved for ξ , and (11) yields
After inserting (12) into (9) , so that A is a generalized inverse (shortly: g-inverse [11] ) of W, and W is a "restricted g-inverse" of A.
Remark 3.6
In the case k = n the matrix V from Definition 3.1 cannot be defined (formally, A ker(B ) is then a "(0, 0)−matrix"). The corresponding result about nonsingularity and the inverse of Q is, however, easily derived: Let A and B be (n, n)−matrices. Then the matrix
is non-singular if and only if B is nonsingular. In the latter case, the inverse of Q is given by
Remark 3.7
Results about the inertia of a matrix structured like Q in Theorem 3.3 can be found in [16] .
Derivatives of Lagrange multipliers
Returning to problem (1), in this section we consider the parametric optimization problem
with x ∈ X := R n , t ∈ T := R r , and functions f ∈ C 2 (R n × R r , R) and h ∈ C 2 (R n × R r , E) with E = R k and k < n. Letx be a nondegenerate critical point of P(t), that is, there exists someλ ∈ R k with D x f x,t +λ D x h x,t = 0 , the matrix D x h x,t has full rank k, and the restricted Hessian
is nonsingular, where
t).
Putting A = D 2 x L x,t,λ and B = D x h x,t , under these assumptions Theorem 3.3(a) implies the nonsingularity of the matrix
We emphasize that nondegeneracy of a critical point is a weak assumption. For example, when the defining functions are in general position, for parameterfree problems all critical points are nondegenerate, and for oneparametric problems almost all critical points are nondegenerate [14] . Moreover, if f is strictly convex in x with D 2 x f (x, t) positive definite for all x and t and if, in addition, h is linear in x with D x h(x, t) = A(t), then the only critical point of P(t) (its global minimizer) is nondegenerate whenever A(t) has full rank.
As Q is the Jacobian with respect to (x, λ) of the system
at x,t,λ , the implicit function theorem and a moment of reflection show that for t close tot there exists a locally unique nondegenerate critical point x(t) of P(t) with multiplier λ(t). In particular, the functions x(t) and λ(t) satisfy the equations
for all t in a neighborhood oft. Assuming thatx is even a nondegenerate local minimizer of P(t), it is not hard to see that x(t) is a local minimizer of P(t) for t close tot. Hence the (local) optimal value function of P(t) is
v(t) = f (x(t), t).
In order to calculate the derivative of v observe that by (14) we may also write
where we used (13) and (14) . For the second derivative of v att we obtain by differentiation of (15)
As differentiation of (13) and (14) yields
we arrive at the formula
where a so-called shift term is subtracted from the Hessian of L with respect to t (cf. [17] for details). With a matrix V whose columns form a basis of ker B = ker D x h x,t we can now evoke Theorem 3.3 to state explicit formulas for these derivatives:
with the notation from Theorem 3.3. More explicitly, the derivative of the Lagrange multiplier is
D th (17) where D xh stands for D x h x,t , etc.
Finally, we consider the special case of problem (2) with f independent of t and h(x, t) = t − H(x). It is easily seen that (15) now yields the well-known result
Moreover, (16) reduces to
Clearly, a combination of (17) and (18) would yield the same result for v t = λ t , as we proposed in the introduction. We illustrate the consequence of this formula for Example 1 from Sect. 2. Example 1, continued For the approximation of the premium we consider the above problem P(t) with f (x, t) = −u(x), h(x, t) = t − H(x), and H(x) = Ax. The assumptions that u is strictly concave with D 2 u(x) negative definite for all x, and that the vector A does not vanish, are usually satisfied in applications.
Then for all t each critical point of P(t) is nondegenerate. The corresponding Lagrange function is L(x, t, λ) = −u(x) + λ(t − Ax).
Letx be a nondegenerate critical point of P t . Then the multiplier satisfies
Moreover, we have D 2 x L(x, t, λ) = −D 2 u(x) so that, with a basis matrix V of ker(A), formula (19) yields
Plugging (20) and (21) 
Final remarks
The approach to use the implicit function theorem in parametric optimization goes back to [7] . We emphasize that it can also be carried out for parametric optimization problems with finitely many inequality constraints, when strict complementarity slackness is added to the nondegeneracy assumptions at a critical point. Our results about the inverse of the Jacobian and the multiplier derivatives then remain unchanged if the set of equality constraints is extended by the active inequality constraints. Instead of differentiability of primal-dual solutions one might contend with Lipschitz behavior. On that issue, see [2] for additive and linear perturbations of convex problems, and [18] for general perturbations of nonconvex problems.
